Paper in progress on G.E. Moore's open question argument

I am currently working on a paper about G.E. Moore's well-known (and much-reviled) open question argument. Basically, I think that almost everyone (both proponent and opponent) has misinterpreted the argument.


Here is the abstract for the paper:


In this paper, I argue that the so-called “open question argument” (OQA) in G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica (PE) has been widely misunderstood. According to the usual reading, which I call the “anti-naturalist reading,” Moore intends the OQA as an argument against identifying goodness with any natural property. I will argue that, in contrast to the anti-naturalist reading, the OQA is meant to show that goodness is simple, not that it is non-natural. Moreover, there are two distinct (though connected) lines of argument in the OQA. Hence, we must distinguish between (a) the two “branches” of the OQA and (b) the argumentative maneuver that both branches involve. Once we understand the true mechanics of the OQA, I believe that we will see that (if slightly modified) it has a strong claim to soundness and is, at least, immune to a number of the criticisms leveled against it.

A draft is now complete. If you would like to read it, please email me (if you have my email) or post a comment below.