Is the idea of the secular state coherent?

In his 2011 article "Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism", Charles Taylor discusses the conflicts inherent in state secularism as it is currently understood. I want to zoom in on one particular difficulty that is suggested (though not explicitly stated) by Taylor—a difficulty that seems to constitute a reductio ad absurdum for secularism as commonly understood.

Taylor identifies three basic principles that are generally regarded as constitutive of secularism (Taylor 2011, pp. 34-35):

1. No one must be forced in the domain of religion or basic belief. This is what is often defined as religious liberty […] This is what is also described as the "free exercise" of religion, in terms of the U.S. First Amendment.
2. There must be equality between people of different faiths or basic belief; no religious outlook or (religious or areligious) Weltanschauung can enjoy a privileged status, let alone be adopted as the official view of the state.
3. All spiritual families must be heard, included in the ongoing process of determining what society is about (its political identity), and how it is going to realize those goals (the exact regime of rights and privileges).

In this post, I am most interested in the first two principles. Taylor observes that these principles are enshrined in the U.S. Constitution:

If one consulted the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution one would find two goals mentioned, the rejection of establishment [i.e. rejection of the establishment of a state-sponsored religion] and the assurance of "free exercise". It is not inconceivable that these could conflict. (Taylor 2011, p. 41)

I want to focus on the last remark in this passage, which Taylor does not develop at length. Under what circumstances could allowing people to freely practice their religion conflict with the rejection of a state-sponsored religion?

The answer is not far to seek. Some religions—or some sects of some religions—seek to establish themselves as state-sponsored religions. Think of the Taliban that used to rule in Afghanistan. The secular state cannot allow adherents of such religions to carry out their goals, given the secular state's refusal to sponsor any religion. But, by preventing them from carrying out their religious goals, isn't the secular state preventing them from freely practicing their religion?

Hence, secularism seem to face a reductio ad absurdum:

1. If secularism is a correct political philosophy, then the state should not sponsor any religion and should allow all religions to be practiced freely. (Premise)
2. There is a religion R such that, if the state does not sponsor R, then the state does not allow R to be practiced freely. (Premise)
3. If the state should do X and (if the state does X, then the state does Y), then the state should do Y. (Premise)
4. Suppose that secularism is a correct political philosophy.
5. The state should not sponsor any religion and should allow all religions to be practiced freely. (1, 4)
6. The state should not sponsor any religion. (5)
7. The state should not sponsor R. (2, 5)
8. The state should not sponsor R, and if the state does not sponsor R, then the state does not allow R to be practiced freely. (2, 7)
9. The state should not allow R to be practiced freely. (3, 8)
10. The state should allow all religions to be practiced freely. (5)
11. The state should allow R to be practiced freely. (2, 10)
12. Contradiction! (9, 11)
13. Therefore, secularism is not a correct political philosophy. (4-12)

By itself, this reductio is not particularly worrisome. Of course allowing people to practice a religion freely can sometimes conflict with the rejection of state-sponsored religion. No one ever said that these two principles would never conflict. We recognize that we sometimes have to balance the principles against each other (Taylor 2011, p. 35). In that case, can't we modify premise 1 slightly? Instead of saying that the state should allow all religions to be practiced freely, can't secularists say that the state should allow all religions to be practiced freely except for those religions whose practices are destructive of the secular state?

Not necessarily.

So far we have been ignoring a crucial question: why do secular states guarantee freedom of religion and refuse to sponsor a religion? What is the philosophical basis for secularism? This is a complex question, but I think that one of the justifications for secularism is the idea that the state should not claim to be competent in judging spiritual matters. Of course, it's possible that individuals know—from natural theology, special revelation, or some other source—which religion is the "right" religion, but the state should not take a stand on this issue.

Let's now return to the question that we raised earlier: can't secularists say that the state should allow all religions to be practiced freely except for those religions whose practices are destructive of the secular state? Can't they say that the secular state should bar religious practices such as those of the Inquisition?

I certainly hope that they say that. But there is a tension between saying that and saying that the state has no competence for judging spiritual matters. What if the Inquisition's religious practices are necessary for saving souls? What if, by not allowing the Inquisition to do its work, the state is condemning countless souls to hell? If the secular state has no competence for judging spiritual matters, then how can it rule out such a possibility? Indeed, how can it even make a judgment about the probability that such a possibility is realized?

None of what I have said should be interpreted as an attack on state secularism, broadly construed. I think that state secularism is one of the most decent institutions ever envisioned. But there is still a theoretical worry. Some (hypothetical and actual) religions have practices that are destructive of the secular state. If the secular state is not in the business of making judgments on spiritual matters, then what grounds does it have for curtailing the practice of those anti-secularist religions?

Reference:

Taylor, Charles. "Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism". The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere. Ed. Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan VanAntwerpen. NY: Columbia UP, 2011.