Natural teleology and moral rightness

The idea of natural teleology is the idea that things have ends or goals that are natural to them, independent of the ends for which people might use them. Some philosophers, such as Aristotle, have made natural teleology the foundation of their ethical theories. They have claimed that a human being's ultimate good is to achieve his or her natural goal. Teleological ethicists generally think that a human being's natural goal is a full, rich, and virtuous human life, or something along those lines.[1] I'm inclined to doubt that human beings have a natural goal, but I find the idea appealing.

Nearly all teleological ethicists would agree that natural teleology isn't limited to what we would ordinarily call "morality".[2] An act can be good or bad from the standpoint of natural teleology without being morally right or wrong. If I spend my free time watching Nyan Cat instead of reading classic literature, then I may be living a less fulfilling life—thus hindering myself from achieving my natural goal—but I'm not being immoral in the ordinary sense of the term. Likewise, if I read the classic literature instead of watching Nyan Cat, then I may be contributing to my natural goal, but it would be odd to call my action morally right.

But can it work the other way? Can an action be morally right without being good from the standpoint of natural teleology, i.e. without serving the agent's natural goal? Yes, or so I'll argue. In fact, I'll go farther. I'll argue that an action can sometimes be morally right even if it hinders the agent from achieving her natural goal.[3]

For the sake of argument, suppose that human beings have a natural goal and that it consists, roughly, in living a full, rich, and virtuous life. Now, imagine that an evil pharmacist has made a pill that exacerbates the negative character traits of the person who takes it. Further, imagine that the pharmacist kidnaps eleven people and gives one of them a choice: either she takes the pill, or the ten other prisoners will have to take it. Which is the morally right choice?

I think the morally right choice is for her to take the pill herself. By taking the pill, she will be diminishing her own virtue, thus diminishing her own chances of achieving the natural goal of human beings. And that goal is presumably a great good. But precisely because the goal is a great good, it would be the height of selfishness for her to make her ten fellow hostages lose that goal so that she can have it. So I think, anyway.

Notice, I'm not imagining a case where an agent has to choose between preserving her own virtue and saving lives. If we're assuming that one's natural goal is also one's ultimate good, and that a human being's natural goal necessarily includes virtue, then we're going to be extremely reluctant to say that an agent should deliberately discard her own virtue even for the sake of saving lives.

Instead, I'm imagining a case where an agent has to choose between preserving her own virtue and preserving the virtue of many others. In such a case, I claim, the morally right act is to preserve the virtue of the others. If I'm right about that, then an act can be right even if it hinders the agent from achieving her natural goal.

I don't intend the above as an argument against natural teleology. As I noted above, I find the idea of natural teleology appealing, if not entirely persuasive. But I think we need to distinguish sharply between achieving one's natural goal and doing what's morally right. If I have a natural goal, then achieving that goal is a great good; but if it's a great good, then there are at least hypothetical situations in which the morally right action is to sacrifice my own share in that good so that others can have it.

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[1] According to Aristotle, the natural goal for a human being is "activity of the soul in accordance with virtue" (Nicomachean Ethics 1098a16). For Aristotle, "virtue" (arête) is a broad term, encompassing all sorts of excellences, not just narrowly "moral" virtues.

[2] As the new-age writer Alan Watts once put it, "if morality consists in doing good to one's fellow man, it is clear that morality exists for man rather than man for morality, and the problem of what man himself is for [i.e. the human goal] is still undecided."

[3] As far as I can tell, Aristotle would disagree with this claim. Of course, Aristotle doesn't think that an agent should care only about achieving her natural goal for herself. Indeed, Aristotle esteems the statesman because the statesman helps the whole state to achieve its goal, rather than just pursuing his goal for himself (Nicomachean Ethics 1094b8-11). Still, as far as I can tell, Aristotle's approach to ethics can't make sense of the idea of setting aside one's natural goal for the sake of doing what is right.